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Abstract—Privacy preservation is addressed for decentralized
optimization, where N agents cooperatively minimize the sum
of N convex functions private to these individual agents. In
most existing decentralized optimization approaches, participat-
ing agents exchange and disclose states explicitly, which may
not be desirable when the states contain sensitive information of
individual agents. The problem is more acute when adversaries
exist which try to steal information from other participating
agents. To address this issue, we propose a privacy-preserving
decentralized optimization approach based on ADMM and par-
tially homomorphic cryptography. To our knowledge, this is
the first time that cryptographic techniques are incorporated
in a fully decentralized setting to enable privacy preservation in
decentralized optimization in the absence of any third party or
aggregator. To facilitate the incorporation of encryption in a fully
decentralized manner, we introduce a new ADMM which allows
time-varying penalty matrices and rigorously prove that it has a
convergence rate of O(1/t). Numerical and experimental results
confirm the effectiveness and low computational complexity of
the proposed approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, decentralized optimization has been playing
key roles in applications as diverse as rendezvous in multi-
agent systems [1], spectrum sensing in cognitive networks
[2], support vector machine in machine learning [3], online
learning [4], classification [5], data regression in statistics [6],
source localization in sensor networks [7], and monitoring
of smart grids [8]. In these applications, the problem can be
formulated in the following general form, in which N agents
cooperatively solve an unconstrained optimization problem:
min
y
N∑
i=1
fi(y), (1)
where variable y ∈ RD is common to all agents, function
fi : RD → R is the local objective function of agent i.
Typical decentralized solutions to the optimization problem
(1) include distributed (sub)gradient based algorithms [9], aug-
mented Lagrangian methods (ALM) [10], and the alternating
direction method of multipliers (ADMM) as well as its variants
[10]–[13], etc. In (sub)gradient based solutions, (sub)gradient
computations and averaging among neighbors are conducted
iteratively to achieve convergence to the minimum. In aug-
mented Lagrangian and ADMM based solutions, iterative
Lagrangian minimization is employed, which, coupled with
dual variable update, guarantees that all agents agree on the
same minimization solution.
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However, most of the aforementioned decentralized ap-
proaches require agents to exchange and disclose their states
explicitly to neighboring agents in every iteration [9]–[13].
This brings about serious privacy concerns in many practical
applications [14]. For example, in projection based source
localization, intermediate states are positions of points lying
on the circles centered at individual nodes’ positions [15], and
thus a node may infer the exact position of a neighboring
node using three intermediate states, which is undesirable
when agents want to keep their position private [16]. In the
rendezvous problem where a group of individuals want to meet
at an agreed time and place [1], exchanging explicit states may
leak their initial locations which may need to be kept secret
instead [17]. Other examples include the agreement problem
[18], where a group of individuals want to reach consensus
on a subject without leaking their individual opinions to
others [17], and the regression problem [6], where individual
agent’s training data may contain sensitive information (e.g.,
salary, medical record) and should be kept private. In addition,
exchanging explicit states without encryption is susceptible
to eavesdroppers which try to intercept and steal information
from exchanged messages.
To enable privacy preservation in decentralized optimiza-
tion, one commonly used approach is differential privacy [19]–
[21], which adds carefully-designed noise to exchanged states
or objective functions to cover sensitive information. However,
the added noise also unavoidably compromises the accuracy
of optimization results, leading to a trade-off between privacy
and accuracy [19]–[21]. In fact, as indicated in [21], even
when no noise perturbation is added, differential-privacy based
approaches may fail to converge to the accurate optimal solu-
tion. It is worth noting that although some differential-privacy
based optimization approaches can converge to the optimal
solution in the mean-square sense with the assistance of a third
party such as a cloud (e.g., [22], [23]), those results are not
applicable to the completely decentralized setting discussed
here where no third parties or aggregators exist. Observability-
based design has been proposed for privacy preservation in
linear multi-agent networks [24], [25]. By properly designing
the weights for the communication graph, agents’ information
will not be revealed to non-neighboring agents. However, this
approach cannot protect the privacy of the direct neighbors of
compromised agents and it is susceptible to external eaves-
droppers. Another approach to enabling privacy preservation
is encryption. However, despite successful applications in
cloud based control and optimization [26]–[29], conventional
cryptographic techniques cannot be applied directly in a com-
pletely decentralized setting without the assistance of aggre-
gators/third parties (note that traditional secure multi-party
computation schemes like fully homomorphic encryption [30]
and Yao’s garbled circuit [31] are computationally too heavy
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to be practical for real-time optimization [14]). Other privacy-
preserving optimization approaches include [32], [33] which
protect privacy via perturbing problems or states. Recently,
by using linear dynamical systems theory to facilitate crypto-
graphic design, we proposed a privacy-preserving decentral-
ized linear consensus approach [34]. However, to the best of
our knowledge, results are still lacking on cryptography based
approaches that can enable privacy for the more complicated
general nonlinear optimization problem like (1) in completely
decentralized setting without any aggregator/third party.
Given that the compromised accuracy of differential-privacy
based approaches makes them inappropriate for applications
where both accuracy and privacy are of primary concern (for
example, when dealing with medical treatment data, even
minimal noise may interfere with users’ learning [35], [36]),
we propose a new privacy-preserving decentralized optimiza-
tion approach based on ADMM and partially homomorphic
cryptography. We used ADMM because it has several advan-
tages. First, ADMM has a fast convergence speed in both
primal and dual iterations [13]. By incorporating a quadratic
regularization term, ADMM has been shown to be able to
obtain satisfactory convergence speed even in ill-conditioned
dual functions [12]. Secondly, the convergence of ADMM has
been established for non-convex and non-smooth objective
function [37]. Moreover, from the implementation point of
view, not only is ADMM easy to parallelize and implement,
but it is also robust to noise and computation errors [38].
It is worth noting that privacy has different meaning under
different settings. For example, in the distributed optimization
literature, privacy has been defined as the non-disclosure of
agents’ states [22], objective functions or subgradients [4],
[21], [39]. In this paper, we define privacy as preserving
the confidentiality of agents’ intermediate states, gradients of
objective functions, and objective functions. We protect the
privacy of objective functions through protecting intermediate
states. In fact, if left unprotected, intermediate states could be
used by an adversary to infer the gradients or even objective
functions of other nodes through, e.g., data mining techniques.
For example, in the regression problem in [6], the objective
functions take the form fi(y) = 12 ‖ si−Biy ‖22, in which si
and Bi are raw data containing sensitive information such as
salary and medical record. When the subgradient method in
[9] is used to solve the optimization problem min
y
N∑
i=1
fi(y),
agent i updates its intermediate states in the following way:
yk+1i =
N∑
j=1
aijy
k
j + αkOfi(yki )
where aij are weights, αk is the stepsize, and Ofi(y) =
BTi Biy − BTi si is the gradient. In this case, an adversary
can infer Ofi(yki ) based on exchanged intermediate states
yi if the weights aij and stepsize αi are publicly known.
We consider two adversaries: Honest-but-curious adversaries
are agents who follow all protocol steps correctly but are
curious and collect all intermediate and input/output data in
an attempt to learn some information about other participating
agents [40]. External eavesdroppers are adversaries who steal
information through wiretapping all communication channels
and intercepting exchanged messages between agents. Protect-
ing agents’ intermediate states can avoid eavesdroppers from
inferring any information in optimization.
Contributions: The main contribution of this paper is a
privacy-preserving decentralized optimization approach based
on ADMM and partially homomorphic cryptography. To our
knowledge, this is the first time that cryptographic techniques
are incorporated in a fully decentralized setting to enable
privacy preservation in decentralized optimization without the
assistance of any third party or aggregator. To facilitate the
incorporation of homomorphic encryption in ADMM in a
fully decentralized manner, we also propose a new ADMM
which allows time-varying penalty matrices and rigorously
characterize its convergence rate of O(1/t). It is worth noting
that the O(1/t) convergence rate requires the subproblems
(primary update) to be efficiently computed. When the sub-
problems are difficult, some suboptimal solution (obtained
by, e.g., the approach in [41]) can be used to approximately
solve the subproblem. In contrast to differential-privacy based
optimization approaches [19]–[22], our approach can enable
privacy preservation without sacrificing accuracy. Moreover,
our approach does not require strong convexity, Lipschitz or
twice continuous differentiability in the objective function.
(It is worth noting that [22] requires a trusted cloud and
hence is not applicable to the completely decentralized setting
discussed here.) Different from the privacy-preserving opti-
mization approach in [39] which only protects the privacy
of gradients, our approach preserves the privacy of both
intermediate states and gradients. In addition, [39] assumes
that an adversary does not have access to the adjacency matrix
of the network graph while our approach does not need this
assumption.
II. A NEW ADMM WITH TIME-VARYING PENALTY
MATRICES
In this section, we propose a new ADMM with time-
varying penalty matrices for (1), which is key for enabling
the incorporation of partially homomorphic cryptography in
a completely decentralized optimization problem for privacy
protection.
A. Problem Formulation
We assume that each fi in (1) is private and only known
to agent i, and all N agents form a bidirectional connected
network. Using the graph theory [42], we represent the
communication pattern of a multi-agent network by a graph
G = {V,E}, where V denotes the set of agents and E denotes
the set of communication links (undirected edges) between
agents. Denote the total number of communication links in E
as |E|. If there exists a communication link between agents
i and j, we say that agent j is a neighbor of i (agent i is a
neighbor of j as well) and denote the communication link as
ei,j ∈ E if i < j is true or ej,i ∈ E if i > j is true. Moreover,
we denote the set of all neighboring agents of i as Ni (we
consider agent i to be a neighbor of itself in this paper, i.e.,
i ∈ Ni, but ei,i /∈ E).
B. Proximal Jacobian ADMM
To solve (1) in a decentralized manner, we reformulate (1) as
follows (which avoids using dummy variables in conventional
ADMM [43]):
min
xi∈RD, i∈{1,2,...,N}
N∑
i=1
fi(xi)
subject to xi = xj , ∀ei,j ∈ E,
(2)
where xi is considered as a copy of x and belongs to agent
i. To solve (2), each agent first exchanges its current state
xi with its neighbors. Then it carries out local computations
based on its private local objective function fi and the received
state information from neighbors to update its state. Iterating
these computations will make every agent reach consensus on
a solution that is optimal to (1) when (1) is convex. Detailed
implementation of the ADMM algorithm based on Jacobian
update is elaborated as follows [44]:
xt+1i = argmin
xi
L(xt1,xt2, ...,xti−1,xi,xti+1, ...,xtN ,λt)
+
γi
2
‖ xi − xti ‖2, (3)
λt+1i,j = λ
t
i,j + ρ(x
t+1
i − xt+1j ), ∀j ∈ Ni (4)
for i = 1, 2, ..., N . Here, t is the iteration index, γi > 0 (i =
1, 2, ..., N) are proximal coefficients, and L is the augmented
Lagrangian function
L(x,λ) =
N∑
i=1
fi(xi)
+
∑
ei,j∈E
(λTi,j(xi − xj) +
ρ
2
‖ xi − xj ‖2).
(5)
In (5), x = [xT1 ,x
T
2 , ...,x
T
N ]
T ∈ RND is the augmented states,
λi,j is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the constraint
xi = xj , and all λi,j for ei,j ∈ E are stacked into λ ∈ R|E|D.
ρ is the penalty parameter, which is a positive constant scalar.
The above ADMM algorithm cannot protect the privacy
of participating agents as states are exchanged and disclosed
explicitly among neighboring agents. To facilitate privacy
design, we propose a new ADMM with time-varying penalty
matrices in the following subsection, which will enable the
integration of homomorphic cryptography and decentralized
optimization in Sec. III.
C. ADMM with Time-varying Penalty Matrices
Motivated by the fact that ADMM allows time-varying
penalty matrices [45], [46], we present in the following an
ADMM with time-varying penalty matrices. It is worth noting
that [45], [46] deal with a two-block (N = 2) problem. While
in this paper, we consider a more general problem with N ≥ 3
blocks, whose convergence is more difficult to analyze. The
generalization from N = 2 to N ≥ 3 is highly non-trivial.
In fact, as indicated in [47], a direct extension from two-
block to multi-block convex minimization is not necessarily
convergent.
We first reformulate (1) in a more compact form:
min
x
f(x)
subject to Ax = 0,
(6)
where x = [xT1 ,x
T
2 , ...,x
T
N ]
T ∈ RND, f(x) =
N∑
i=1
fi(xi),
and A = [am,n] ⊗ ID ∈ R|E|D×ND is the edge-node
incidence matrix of graph G as defined in [48], with its |E|D
rows corresponding to the |E| communication links and the
ND columns corresponding to the N agents. The symbol ⊗
denotes Kronecker product. The am,n element is defined as
am,n =
 1 if the m
th edge originates from agent n,
−1 if the mth edge terminates at agent n,
0 otherwise.
Here we define that each edge ei,j originates from agent i and
terminates at agent j.
Let λi,j be the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the
constraint xi = xj , then we can form an augmented La-
grangian function of problem (6) as
L(x,λ,ρ) =
N∑
i=1
fi(xi)
+
∑
ei,j∈E
(λTi,j(xi − xj) +
ρi,j
2
‖ xi − xj ‖2),
(7)
or in a more compact form:
L(x,λ,ρ) = f(x) + λTAx+ 1
2
‖ Ax ‖2ρ, (8)
where λ = [λi,j ]ij,ei,j∈E ∈ R|E|D is the augmented Lagrange
multiplier,
ρ = diag{ρi,jID}ij,ei,j∈E ∈ R|E|D×|E|D, ρi,j > 0
is the time-varying penalty matrix, and ‖ Ax ‖2ρ= xTATρAx.
Note that if ρi,jID is the mth block in ρ, then ei,j is the
mth edge in E, i.e., for the one-dimensional case, am,i = 1
and am,j = −1, and for high dimensional cases, the (m, i)th
block of A is ID and the (m, j)th block of A is −ID.
Now, inspired by [46], we propose a new ADMM which
allows time-varying penalty matrices based on Jacobian update
[49]:
xt+1i = argmin
xi
L(xt1,xt2, ...,xti−1,xi,xti+1, ...,xtN ,λt,ρt)
+
γi
2
‖ xi − xti ‖2, (9)
ρti,j → ρt+1i,j , (10)
λt+1i,j = λ
t
i,j + ρ
t+1
i,j (x
t+1
i − xt+1j ), ∀j ∈ Ni (11)
for i = 1, 2, ..., N . It is worth noting that although the commu-
nication graph is undirected, we introduce both λi,j and λj,i
for ei,j ∈ E in (4) and (11) to unify the algorithm description.
More specifically, we set λ0i,j = ρ
0
i,j(x
0
i − x0j ) at t = 0 such
that λti,j = −λtj,i holds for all i = 1, 2, · · · , N, j ∈ Ni. In this
way, we can unify the update rule of agent i without separating
i > j and i < j for j ∈ Ni, as shown in (12).
Remark 1. The proximal Jacobian ADMM (3)-(4) can be
considered as a special case of (9)-(11) by assigning the
same and constant weight ρi,j = ρ to different equality
constraints xi = xj . Different from the ADMM which uses the
same ρ (which might be time-varying in, e.g., the two-block
optimization problem [50]) for all equality constraints, the
new approach uses different and time-varying ρi,j for different
equality constraints xi = xj . As indicated later, this is key for
enabling privacy preservation.
Remark 2. We did not use Gauss-Seidel update [48], which
requires a predefined global order and hence as indicated in
[44], is not amenable to parallelism. Different from [44] which
has a constant penalty parameter, we intentionally introduce
time-varying penalty matrix to enable privacy preservation.
Despite enabling new capabilities in privacy protection (with
the assistance of partially homomorphic Paillier encryption),
introducing time-varying penalty matrix also reduces conver-
gence rate to O(1/t), in contrast to the o(1/t) rate in [44].
Besides giving new capabilities in privacy and different result
in convergence rate, the novel idea of intentional time-varying
penalty matrix also leads to difference in theoretical analysis
in comparison with [44]. For example, different from [44]
which relies on constant-penalty based monotonically non-
increasing sequences to prove convergence, our introduction
of time-varying penalty matrix results in non-monotonic se-
quences which prompted us to use a variational inequality to
facilitate the analysis.
It is obvious that the new ADMM (9)-(11) can be
implemented in a decentralized manner. The detailed
implementation procedure is outlined in Algorithm I.
Algorithm I
Initial Setup: Each agent i initializes x0i , ρ0i,j .
Input: xti, λ
t−1
i,j , ρ
t
i,j
Output: xt+1i , λti,j , ρ
t+1
i,j
1) Each agent i sends xti, ρ
t
i,j to its neighboring agents, and
then set ρti,j = min{ρti,j , ρtj,i}. It is clear that ρti,j = ρtj,i
holds.
2) Each agent i updates λti,j as follows for j ∈ Ni
λti,j = λ
t−1
i,j + ρ
t
i,j(x
t
i − xtj). (12)
It is clear that λti,j = −λtj,i holds (note that when t = 0,
we set λ0i,j = ρ
0
i,j(x
0
i − x0j )).
3) All agents update their local vectors in parallel:
xt+1i ∈ argminxifi(xi) +
γi
2
‖ xi − xti ‖2
+
∑
j∈Ni
((λti,j)
Txi +
ρti,j
2
‖ xi − xtj ‖2).
(13)
Here we added two proximal terms
ρti,i
2 ‖ xi − xti ‖2
and γi2 ‖ xi − xti ‖2 to accommodate the influence of
xti. For all γi > 0, ρ
t
i,i is set to
ρti,i = 1−
∑
j∈Ni,j 6=i
ρti,j . (14)
4) Each agent i updates ρt+1i,j for all j ∈ Ni and sets t =
t+1. The detailed update rule for ρi,j will be elaborated
later in Theorem 1.
Remark 3. A weighted ADMM which also assigns different
weights to different equality constraints is proposed in [13].
However, the weights in [13] are constant while Algorithm I
allows time-varying weights in each iteration, which, as shown
later, is key to enable the integration of partially homomorphic
cryptography with decentralized optimization.
D. Convergence Analysis
In this subsection, we rigorously prove the convergence of
Algorithm I under the following standard assumptions [48]:
Assumption 1. Each private local function fi : RD → R is
convex and continuously differentiable.
Assumption 2. Problem (6) has an optimal solution, i.e., the
Lagrangian function
L(x,λ) = f(x) + λTAx (15)
has a saddle point (x∗,λ∗) such that
L(x∗,λ) ≤ L(x∗,λ∗) ≤ L(x,λ∗)
holds for all x ∈ RND and λ ∈ R|E|D.
Denote the iterating results in the kth step in Algorithm I
as follows:
xk = [xkT1 ,x
kT
2 , ...,x
kT
N ]
T ∈ RND,
λk = [λki,j ]ij,ei,j∈E ∈ R|E|D,
ρk = diag{ρki,jID}ij,ei,j∈E ∈ R|E|D×|E|D.
Further augment the coefficients γi (i = 1, 2, ..., N) in (13)
into the matrix form
QP = diag{γ1, γ2, . . . , γN} ⊗ ID ∈ RND×ND,
and augment ρki,j into the following matrix form
QkC = diag{
∑
j∈N1
ρk1,j ,
∑
j∈N2
ρk2,j , . . . ,
∑
j∈NN
ρkN,j} ⊗ ID,
and QkC ∈ RND×ND. By plugging (14) into QkC , we have
QkC = IND, i.e., Q
k
C is an identity matrix.
Now we are in position to give the main results of this
subsection:
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, Algo-
rithm I is guaranteed to converge to an optimal solution to
(6) if the following two conditions are met:
Condition A: The sequence {ρk} satisfies
0 ≺ ρ0  ρk  ρk+1  ρ¯, ∀k ≥ 0,
where ρ0  0 means that ρ0 is positive definite, and similarly
ρk  ρk+1 means that ρk+1 − ρk is positive semi-definite.
Condition B: QP +QkC  AT ρ¯A.
Proof: The proof is provided in the Appendix. 
Theorem 2. The convergence rate of Algorithm I is O(1/t),
where t is the iteration time.
Proof: The proof is provided in the Appendix. 
III. PRIVACY-PRESERVING DECENTRALIZED
OPTIMIZATION
Algorithm I requires agents to exchange and disclose states
explicitly in each iteration among neighboring agents to reach
consensus on the final optimal solution. In this section, we
combine partially homomorphic cryptography with Algorithm
I to propose a privacy-preserving approach for decentralized
optimization. We first give the definition of privacy used in
this paper.
Definition 1. A mechanism M :M(X )→ Y is defined to be
privacy preserving if the input X cannot be uniquely derived
from the output Y .
This definition of privacy is inspired by the privacy-
preservation definitions in [4], [39], [51]–[54] which take
advantages of the fact that if a system of equations has infinite
number of solutions, it is impossible to derive the exact value
of the original input data from the output data. Therefore,
privacy preservation is achieved (see, e.g, Part 4.2.2 in [53]).
Next, we introduce the Paillier cryptosystem and our privacy-
preserving approach.
A. Paillier Cryptosystem
Our method uses the flexibility of time-varying penalty
matrices in Algorithm I to enable the incorporation of Paillier
cryptosystem [55] in a completely decentralized setting. The
Paillier cryptosystem is a public-key cryptosystem which uses
a pair of keys: a public key and a private key. The public
key can be disseminated publicly and used by any person to
encrypt a message, but the message can only be decrypted
by the private key. The Paillier cryptosystem includes three
algorithms, which are detailed below:
Paillier cryptosystem
Key generation:
1) Choose two large prime numbers p and q of equal bit-
length and compute n = pq.
2) Let g = n+ 1.
3) Let λ = φ(n) = (p−1)(q−1), where φ(·) is the Euler’s
totient function.
4) Let µ = φ(n)−1 mod n which is the modular multi-
plicative inverse of φ(n).
5) The public key kp for encryption is (n, g).
6) The private key ks for decryption is (λ, µ).
Encryption (c = E(m)):
Recall the definitions of Zn = {z|z ∈ Z, 0 ≤ z < n} and
Z∗n = {z|z ∈ Z, 0 ≤ z < n, gcd(z, n) = 1}.
1) Choose a random r ∈ Z∗n.
2) The ciphertext is given by c = gm · rn mod n2, where
m ∈ Zn, c ∈ Z∗n2 .
Decryption (m = D(c)):
1) Define the integer division function L(µ) = µ−1n .
2) The plaintext is m = L(cλ mod n2) · µ mod n.
A notable feature of Paillier cryptosystem is that it is
additively homomorphic, i.e., the ciphertext of m1 + m2 can
be obtained from the ciphertext of m1 and m2 directly:
E(m1, r1) · E(m2, r2) = E(m1 +m2, r1r2), (16)
E(m)k = E(km), k ∈ Z+. (17)
Due to the existence of random r, the Paillier cryptosystem is
resistant to the dictionary attack [56]. Since r1 and r2 play no
role in the decryption process, (16) can be simplified as
E(m1) · E(m2) = E(m1 +m2). (18)
B. Privacy-Preserving Decentralized Optimization
In this subsection, we combine Paillier cryptosystem with
Algorithm I to enable privacy preservation in the decentralized
solving of optimization problem (1). First, note that solving
(13) amounts to solving the following problem:
Ofi(xi) +
∑
j∈Ni
(λti,j + ρ
t
i,j(xi − xtj)) + γi(xi − xti) = 0.
(19)
Let λi =
∑
j∈Ni
λi,j , then (19) reduces to the following
equation
Ofi(xi) + (
∑
j∈Ni
ρti,j + γi)xi + λ
t
i −
∑
j∈Ni
ρti,jx
t
j − γixti = 0.
(20)
Given that we have set ρti,i = 1−
∑
j∈Ni,j 6=i
ρti,j in (14), we
can further reduce (20) to
Ofi(xi) + (1 + γi)xi + λti
−
∑
j∈Ni
ρti,j(x
t
j − xti)− (1 + γi)xti = 0. (21)
By constructing ρti,j , i 6= j as the product of two random
positive numbers, i.e., ρti,j = b
t
ij × btji = ρtj,i, with btij
only known to agent i and btji only known to agent j, we
can propose the following privacy-preserving solution to (1)
based on Algorithm I:
Algorithm II
Initial Setup: Each agent initializes x0i .
Input: xti, λ
t−1
i,j
Output: xt+1i , λti,j
1) Agent i encrypts −xti with its public key kpi:
xti → Ei(−xti).
Here the subscript i denotes encryption using the public
key of agent i.
2) Agent i sends Ei(−xti) and its public key kpi to neigh-
boring agents.
3) Agent j ∈ Ni encrypts xtj with agent i’s public key kpi:
xtj → Ei(xtj).
4) Agent j ∈ Ni computes the difference directly in
ciphertext:
Ei(xtj − xti) = Ei(xtj) · Ei(−xti).
5) Agent j ∈ Ni computes the btji-weighted difference in
ciphertext:
Ei(btji(xtj − xti)) = (Ei(xtj − xti))btji .
6) Agent j ∈ Ni sends Ei(btji(xtj − xti)) back to agent i.
7) Agent i decrypts the message received from j with its
private key ksi and multiples the result with btij to get
ρti,j(x
t
j − xti).
8) Computing (12), agent i obtains λti,j .
9) Computing (21), agent i obtains xt+1i .
10) Each agent updates btij to bt+1ij and sets t = t+ 1.
Several remarks are in order:
1) The only situation that a neighbor knows the state of
agent i is when xti = x
t
j is true for j ∈ Ni. Otherwise,
agent i’s state xti is encrypted and will not be revealed
to its neighbors.
2) Agent i’s state xti and its intermediate communication
data btji(xtj − xti) will not be revealed to outside
eavesdroppers, since they are encrypted.
3) The state of agent j ∈ Ni will not be revealed to agent
i, because the decrypted message obtained by agent i
is btji(xtj − xti) with btji only known to agent j and
varying in each iteration.
4) We encrypt Ei(−xti) because it is much easier to com-
pute addition in ciphertext. The issue regarding encryp-
tion of signed values using Paillier will be addressed in
Sec. V.
5) Paillier encryption cannot be performed on vectors di-
rectly. For vector messages xti ∈ RD, each element of
the vector (a real number) has to be encrypted separately.
For notation convenience, we still denote it in the same
way as scalars, e.g., Ei(−xti).
6) Paillier cryptosystem only works for integers, so addi-
tional steps have to be taken to convert real values in
optimization to integers. This may lead to quantization
errors. A common workaround is to scale the real value
before quantization, as discussed in detail in Sec. V.
7) By incorporating Paillier cryptosystem, it is obvious that
the computation complexity and communication load
will increase. However, we argue that the privacy pro-
vided matters more than this disadvantage when privacy
is of primary concern. Furthermore, our experimental
results on Raspberry Pi boards confirm that the added
communication and computation overhead is fully man-
ageable on embedded microcontrollers (cf. Sec. VII).
8) Our approach is more suitable for small and medium
sized optimization problems such as the source localiza-
tion problem [7] and power system monitoring problem
[57] addressed in our prior work.
The key to achieve privacy preservation is to construct
ρti,j , i 6= j as the product of two random positive numbers
btij and btji, with btij generated by and only known to
agent i and btji generated by and only known to agent j.
Next we show that the privacy preservation mechanism does
not affect the convergence to the optimal solution.
Theorem 3. The privacy-preserving algorithm II will generate
a solution in an ε ball around the optimum if btij , btji, and
γi are updated in the following way (where ε depends on the
quantization error):
1) btij is randomly chosen from [bt−1ij , b¯ij ], with b¯ij > 0
denoting a predetermined constant only known to agent
i;
2) γi is chosen randomly in the interval [Nb¯2, b¯], with b¯ >
max{b¯ij} denoting a predetermined positive constant
known to everyone and b¯ a threshold chosen arbitrarily
by agent i and only known to agent i.
Proof: It can be easily obtained that if btij is updated
following 1), and γi is updated following 2), then Condition
A and Condition B in Theorem 1 will be met automatically.
Therefore, the states in algorithm II should converge to the
optimal solution. However, since Paillier cryptosystem only
works on unsigned integers, it requires converting real-valued
states to integers using e.g., fixed-point arithmetic encoding
[58] (after scaled by a large number Nmax, cf. Sec. V), which
leads to quantization errors. The quantization errors lead to
numerical errors on the final solution and hence the “ε-ball”
statement in Theorem 3. It is worth noting that the numerical
error here is no different from the conventional quantization
errors met by all algorithms when implemented in practice
on a computer. A quantized analysis of the ε-ball is usually
notoriously involved and hence we refer interested readers
to [59] which is dedicated to this problem. Furthermore, we
would like to emphasize that this quantization error can be
made arbitrarily small by using an arbitrarily large Nmax. In
fact, our simulation results in Sec. VI B showed that under
Nmax = 10
6, the final error was on the order of 10−14. 
IV. PRIVACY ANALYSIS
As indicated in the introduction, our approach aims to
protect the privacy of agents’ intermediate states xtis and
gradients of fis as well as the objective functions. In this
section, we rigorously prove that these private information
cannot be inferred by honest-but-curious adversaries and exter-
nal eavesdroppers, which are commonly used attack models in
privacy studies [40] (cf. definition in Sec. I). It is worth noting
that the form of each agent’s local objective function can
also be totally blind to others, e.g., whether it is a quadratic,
exponential, or other forms of convex functions is only known
to an agent itself.
As indicated in Sec. III, our approach in Algorithm II
guarantees that state information is not leaked to any neigh-
bor in one iteration. However, would some information get
leaked over time? More specifically, if an honest-but-curious
adversary observes carefully its communications with neigh-
bors over several steps, can it put together all the received
information to infer its neighbor’s state?
We can rigorously prove that an honest-but-curious adver-
sary cannot infer the exact states of its neighbors even by
collecting samples from multiple steps.
Theorem 4. Assume that all agents follow Algorithm II. Then
agent j’s exact state value xkj cannot be inferred by an honest-
but-curious agent i unless xki = x
k
j is true.
Proof: Suppose that an honest-but-curious agent i collects
information from K iterations to infer the information of a
neighboring agent j. From the perspective of adversary agent
i, the measurements (corresponding to neighboring agent j)
seen in each iteration k are yk = bkijbkji(xkj − xki ) (k =
0, 1, ...,K), i.e., adversary agent i can establish (K + 1)D
equations based on received information:
y0 = b0ijb0ji(x0j − x0i ),
y1 = b1ijb1ji(x1j − x1i ),
...
yK−1 = bK−1ij bK−1ji (xK−1j − xK−1i ),
yK = bKijbKji(xKj − xKi ).
(22)
To the adversary agent i, in the system of equations (22),
yk, bkij ,xki (k = 0, 1, 2, ...,K) are known, but xkj , bkji (k =
0, 1, 2, ...,K) are unknown. So the above system of (K+1)D
equations contains (K + 1)D + K + 1 unknown variables.
It is clear that adversary agent i cannot solve the system of
equations (22) to infer the exact values of unknowns xkj and
bkji (k = 0, 1, 2, ...,K) of agent j. It is worth noting that
if for some time index k, xkj = x
k
i happens to be true, then
adversary agent i will be able to know that agent j has the
same state at this time index based on the fact that yk is 0. 
Using a similar way of reasoning, we can obtain that an
honest-but-curious adversary agent i cannot infer the exact
gradient of objective function fj from a neighboring agent
j at any point when agent j has another legitimate neighbor
other than the honest-but curious neighbor i.
Theorem 5. In Algorithm II, the exact gradient of fj at any
point cannot be inferred by an honest-but-curious agent i if
agent j has another legitimate neighbor.
Proof: Suppose that an honest-but-curious adversary agent
i collects information from K iterations to infer the gradient
of function fj of a neighboring agent j. The adversary agent
i can establish KD equations corresponding to the gradient
of fj by making use of the fact that the update rule (21) is
publicly known, i.e.,
Ofj(x1j ) + (1 + γj)x1j + λ0j
−
∑
m∈Nj
ρ0j,m(x
0
m − x0j )− (1 + γj)x0j = 0,
Ofj(x2j ) + (1 + γj)x2j + λ1j
−
∑
m∈Nj
ρ1j,m(x
1
m − x1j )− (1 + γj)x1j = 0,
...
Ofj(xK−1j ) + (1 + γj)xK−1j + λK−2j
−
∑
m∈Nj
ρK−2j,m (x
K−2
m − xK−2j )− (1 + γj)xK−2j = 0,
Ofj(xKj ) + (1 + γj)xKj + λK−1j
−
∑
m∈Nj
ρK−1j,m (x
K−1
m − xK−1j )− (1 + γj)xK−1j = 0.
(23)
In the system of KD equations (23), Ofj(xkj ) (k =
1, 2, ...,K), γj , and xkj (k = 0, 1, 2, ...,K) are unknown to
adversary agent i. Parameters λkj and
∑
m∈Nj
ρkj,m(x
k
m − xkj )
(k = 0, 1, 2, ...,K − 1) are known to adversary agent i only
when agent j has agent i as the only neighbor. Otherwise,
λkj and
∑
m∈Nj
ρkj,m(x
k
m − xkj ) (k = 0, 1, 2, ...,K − 1) are
unknown to adversary agent i. Noting that λk+1j = λ
k
j −∑
m∈Nj
ρk+1j,m (x
k+1
m −xk+1j ) and λ0j = −
∑
m∈Nj
ρ0j,m(x
0
m −x0j ),
we can see that the above system of KD equations contains
3KD + D + 1 unknowns when agent j has more than one
neighbor. Therefore, adversary agent i cannot infer the exact
values of Ofj(xkj ) by solving (23).
It is worth noting that after the optimization converges,
adversary agent i can have another piece of information
according to the KKT conditions [44]:
Ofj(x∗j ) = −λ∗j (24)
where x∗j denotes the optimal solution and λ
∗
j denotes the
optimal multiplier. However, since λ∗j is known to adversary
agent i only when agent j has agent i as the only neighbor,
we have that adversary agent i cannot infer the exact value of
fj at any point when agent j has another legitimate neighbor
besides an honest-but curious neighbor i. 
Using a similar way of reasoning, we have the following
corollary corresponding to the situation where agent j has
honest-but-curious agent i as the only neighbor.
Corollary 1. In Algorithm II, the exact gradient of fj at
the optimal solution can be inferred by an honest-but-curious
agent i if agent j has adversary agent i as the only neighbor.
However, at any other point, the gradient of fj is uninferrable
by the adversary agent i.
Proof: Following a similar line of reasoning of Theorem 5,
we can obtain the above Corollary. 
Based on Theorem 4, Theorem 5, and Corollary 1, we
can obtain that agent i cannot infer agent j’s local objective
function fj .
Corollary 2. In Algorithm II, agent j’s local objective function
fj cannot be inferred by an honest-but-curious agent i.
Proof: According to Theorem 4, Theorem 5, and Corollary
1, the intermediate states and corresponding gradients of fj
cannot be inferred by adversary i. Therefore, adversary i
cannot infer agent j’s local objective function fj as well. 
Furthermore, we have that an external eavesdropper cannot
infer any private information of all agents.
Corollary 3. All agents’ intermediate states, gradients of
objective functions, and objective functions cannot be inferred
by an external eavesdropper.
Proof: Since all exchanged messages are encrypted and
that cracking the encryption is practically infeasible [56], an
external eavesdropper cannot learn anything by intercepting
these messages. Therefore, it cannot infer any agent’s inter-
mediate states, gradients of objective functions, and objective
functions. 
From the above analysis, it is obvious that agent j’s private
information cannot be uniquely derived by adversaries. How-
ever, an honest-but-curious neighbor i can still get some range
information about the state xkj and this range information
will become tighter as xkj converges to the optimal solution
as k → ∞ (cf. the simulation results in Fig. 4). We argue
that this is completely unavoidable for any privacy-preserving
approaches because all agents have to agree on the same final
state, upon which the privacy of xkj will disappear. In fact, this
is also acknowledged in [19], which shows that the privacy of
xkj will vanish as k → ∞ and the noise variance converges
to zero at the state corresponding to the optimal solution. It
is worth noting that when the constraint is of a form different
from consensus, it may be possible to protect the privacy of
xkj when k →∞. However, how to incorporate the proposed
privacy mechanism in decentralized optimization under non-
consensus constraint is difficult and will be addressed in our
future work.
Remark 4. It is worth noting that an adversary agent i
can combine systems of equations (22) and (23) to infer
the information of a neighboring agent j. However, this will
not increase the ability of adversary agent i because the
combination will not change the fact that the number of
unknowns is greater than the number of establishable relevant
equations. In addition, if all other agents collude to infer xkj
of agent j, these agents can be considered as one agent which
amounts to having a network consisting of two agents.
Remark 5. From Theorem 4, we can see that in decentralized
optimization, an agent’s information will not be disclosed to
other agents no matter how many neighbors it has. This is
in distinct difference from the average consensus problem in
[17], [34] where privacy cannot be protected for an agent if
it has an honest-but-curious adversary as the only neighbor.
V. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
In this section, we discuss several technical issues that have
to be addressed in the implementation of Algorithm II.
1) In modern communication, a real number is represented
by a floating point number, while encryption techniques
only work for unsigned integers. To deal with this prob-
lem, we uniformly multiplied each element of the vector
message xti ∈ RD (in floating point representation) by
a sufficiently large number Nmax and round off the
fractional part during the encryption to convert it to an
integer. After decryption, the result is divided by Nmax.
This process is conducted in each iteration and this
quantization brings an error upper-bounded by 1Nmax . In
implementation, Nmax can be chosen according to the
used data structure.
2) As indicated in 1), encryption techniques only work
for unsigned integers. In our implementation all integer
values are stored in fix-length integers (i.e., long int
in C) and negative values are left in 2’s complement
format. Encryption and intermediate computations are
carried out as if the underlying data were unsigned.
When the final message is decrypted, the overflown bits
(bits outside the fixed length) are discarded and the
remaining binary number is treated as a signed integer
which is later converted back to a real value.
VI. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we first illustrate the efficiency of the
proposed approach using C/C++ implementations. Then we
compare our approach with the algorithm in [19] and the
algorithm in [39]. The open-source C implementation of the
Paillier cryptosystem [60] is used in our simulations. We
conducted numerical experiments on the following global
objective function
f(x) =
N∑
i=1
1
pi
‖ Hix− θi ‖2, (25)
which makes the optimization problem (1) become
min
x
N∑
i=1
1
pi
‖ Hix− θi ‖2 (26)
with θi ∈ RD, Hi = hiID (hi ∈ R), and pi > 0 (pi ∈
R). Hence, each agent i deals with a private local objective
function
fi(xi) =
1
pi
‖ Hixi − θi ‖2,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. (27)
We used the above function (25) because it is easy to verify
whether the obtained solution is the minimal value of the
original optimization problem, which should be
∑N
i=1
2hi
pi
θi∑N
i=1
2h2
i
pi
.
Furthermore, (25) makes it easy to compare with [19], whose
verification is also based on (25).
In the implementation, the parameters are set as follows:
Nmax was set to 106 to convert each element in xi to a 64-bit
integer during intermediate computations. btij was also scaled
up in the same way and represented by a 64-bit integer. The
encryption and decryption keys were chosen as 256-bit long.
A. Evaluation of Our Approach
We implemented Algorithm II on different network topolo-
gies, all of which gave the right optimal solution. Simulation
results confirmed that our approach always converged to the
optimal solution of (26). Fig. 2 visualizes the evolution of
xi (i = 1, 2, ..., 6) in one specific run where the network
deployment is illustrated in Fig. 1. In Fig. 2, xij (i =
1, 2, ..., 6, j = 1, 2) denotes the jth element of xi. All xi
(i = 1, 2, ..., 6) converged to the optimal solution [38.5; 4076 ].
In this run, b¯ was set to 0.65 and γis were set to 3.
Fig. 3 visualizes the encrypted weighted differences (in
ciphertext) E1(bt21(xt21 − xt11)), E1(bt41(xt41 − xt11)), and
E1(bt61(xt61−xt11)). It is worth noting that although the states
of all agents have converged after about 40 iterations, the
encrypted weighted differences (in ciphertext) still appeared
random to an outside eavesdropper.
We also simulated an honest-but-curious adversary who tries
to estimate its neighbors’ intermediate states and gradients
in order to estimate the objective function. We considered
the worse case of two agents (A and B) where agent B
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Fig. 1: A network of six agents (N = 6).
0 20 40 60 80 100
Iteration
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
St
at
e
x11
x12
x21
x22
x31
x32
x41
x42
x51
x52
x61
x62
Fig. 2: The evolution of xi (i = 1, 2, ..., 6).
is the honest-but-curious adversary and intends to estimate
the objective function fA of agent A. The individual local
objective functions are the same as (27) with θi ∈ R. Because
agent B knows the constraints on agent A’s generation of btAB
and γA (cf. Theorem 3), it generates estimates of btAB and γA
in the same random way. Then it obtained a series of estimated
xtA and OfA(xtA) according to (23). Finally, agent B used the
estimated xtA and OfA(xtA) to estimate fA.
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show the estimated xA and fA in 2,000
trials when agent B used simple linear regression to estimate
OfA(x). Fig. 5 suggests that agent B cannot get a good
estimate of fA. Moreover, it is worth noting that all these
estimated functions give the same optimal solution as fA to
the optimization problem (26).
In addition, the encryption/decryption computation took
about 1ms for each agent to communicate with one neighbor
at each iteration on a 3.6 GHz CPU, which is manageable
in small or medium sized real-time optimization problems
such as the source localization problem [7] and power system
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Fig. 3: The evolution of the encrypted weighted differences
(in ciphertext) E1(bt21(xt21 − xt11)), E1(bt41(xt41 − xt11)),
and E1(bt61(xt61 − xt11)).
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Fig. 4: Estimated states of xA in 2,000 trials.
monitoring problem [57] addressed in our prior work. For
large sized optimization problems like machine learning with
extremely large dimensions, the approach may be computa-
tionally too heavy due to the underlying Paillier encryption
scheme.
B. Comparison with the algorithm in [19]
We then compared our approach with the differential-
privacy based privacy-preserving optimization algorithm in
[19]. Under the communication topology in Fig. 1, we simu-
lated the algorithm in [19] under seven different privacy levels:
 = 0.2, 1, 10, 20, 30, 50, 100. The global function we used
for comparison was (25) with pi (i = 1, 2, .., 6) fixed to 2,
hi (i = 1, 2, .., 6) fixed to 1, and θi = [0.1 × (i − 1) +
0.1; 0.1× (i− 1) + 0.2]. The domain of optimization was set
Fig. 5: Estimated functions of fA in 2,000 trials.
to X = {(x, y) ∈ R2|x2 + y2 ≤ 1} for the algorithm in
[19]. Note that the optimal solution [0.35; 0.45] resided in X .
Parameter settings for the algorithm in [19] are detailed as
follows: n = 2, c = 0.5, q = 0.8, p = 0.9, and
aij =

0.2 j ∈ Ni\i,
0 j /∈ Ni,
1−
∑
j∈Ni\i
aij i = j,
(28)
for i = 1, 2, ..., 6. Here Ni\i denotes all values except i in set
Ni. Furthermore, we used the performance index d in [19] to
quantify the optimization error, which was computed as the
average value of squared distances with respect to the optimal
solution over M runs [19], i.e.,
d =
6∑
i=1
M∑
k=1
‖ xki − [0.35; 0.45] ‖2
6M
with xki the obtained solution of agent i in the kth run.
Simulation results from 5,000 runs showed that our ap-
proach converged to [0.35; 0.45] with an error d = 3.14 ×
10−14, which is negligible compared with the simulation
results under the algorithm in [19] (cf. Fig. 6, where each
differential privacy level was implemented for 5,000 times).
The results confirm the trade-off between privacy and accuracy
for differential-privacy based approaches and demonstrate the
advantages of our approach in terms of optimization accuracy.
C. Comparison with the algorithm in [39]
We also compared our approach with the privacy-preserving
optimization algorithm in [39]. The network communication
topology used for comparison is still the one in Fig. 1 and the
global objective function used is (25) with pi (i = 1, 2, .., 6)
fixed to 2, hi (i = 1, 2, .., 6) fixed to 1, and θi ∈ R2. The
adjacency matrix of network graph is defined in (28) for the
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Fig. 6: The comparison of our approach with the algorithm in
[19] in terms of optimization error.
algorithm in [39]. Moreover, we let every agent update at each
iteration and ci = 1 (i = 1, ..., 6) for [39]. The initial states
are set to the same values for both algorithms.
Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 show the evolution of xi in our approach
and the algorithm in [39] respectively. It is clear that our
approach converged faster than the algorithm in [39].
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Fig. 7: The evolution of xi in our approach.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION ON RASPBERRY PI BOARDS
We also implemented our privacy-preserving approach on
twelve Raspberry Pi boards to confirm the efficiency of the
approach in real-world physical systems. Each board has 64-
bit ARMv8 CPU and 1 GB RAM (cf. Fig. 9). The opti-
mization problem (26) was used in implementation with pi
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Fig. 8: The evolution of xi in the algorithm of [39].
(i = 1, 2, .., 6) fixed to 2, hi (i = 1, 2, .., 6) fixed to 1,
and θi ∈ R. In the implementation, “libpaillier-0.8” library
[61] was used to realize the Paillier encryption and decryp-
tion process, “sys/socket.h” C library was used to conduct
communication through Wi-Fi, and “pthread” C library was
used to generate multiple parallel threads to realize parallelism
in multi-agent networks. The encryption and decryption keys
were chosen as 512-bit long.
Implementation results confirmed that our approach always
converged to the optimal solution. Fig. 10 visualizes the evo-
lution of xi (i = 1, 2, ..., 12) in one specific implementation
where the network topology used is a cycle graph. We can see
that each xi converged to the optimal solution 188.417.
Fig. 9: The twelve Raspberry Pi boards
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a privacy-preserving decentral-
ized optimization approach by proposing a new ADMM and
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Fig. 10: The evolution of xi in the experimental verification
using Raspberry Pi boards.
leveraging partially homomorphic cryptography. By incorpo-
rating Paillier cryptosystem into the newly proposed decen-
tralized ADMM, our approach provides guarantee for privacy
preservation without compromising the solution in the absence
of any aggregator or third party. This is in sharp contrast to
differential-privacy based approaches which protect privacy
through injecting noise and are subject to a fundamental
trade-off between privacy and accuracy. Theoretical analysis
confirms that an honest-but-curious adversary cannot infer
the information of neighboring agents even by recording and
analyzing the information exchanged in multiple iterations.
The new ADMM allows time-varying penalty matrices and
have a theoretically guaranteed convergence rate of O(1/t),
which makes it of mathematical interest by itself. Numerical
and experimental results are given to confirm the effectiveness
and efficiency of the proposed approach.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
The key idea to prove Theorem 1 is to show that Al-
gorithm I converges to the saddle point of the Lagrangian
function L(x,λ) = f(x) + λTAx. To achieve this goal, we
introduce a variational inequality MV I(Q,U) first and prove
that the solution of MV I(Q,U) is also the saddle point of
the Lagrangian function L(x,λ) = f(x) + λTAx (which
is formulated as Lemma 1). Then we introduce a sufficient
condition for solving MV I(Q,U) in Lemma 2. After the two
steps, what is left is to prove that the iterates of Algorithm I
satisfy the condition in Lemma 2 when k →∞, i.e., Algorithm
I converges to the solution of MV I(Q,U) (Theorem 6 and
Theorem 7).
We form a variational inequality MV I(Q,U) similar to
(5)-(6) in [62] first:
〈u− u∗,Q(u∗)〉 ≥ 0, ∀u, (29)
where
u∗ :=

x∗1
x∗2
...
x∗N
λ∗
 , Q(u∗) :=

ξ∗1 + [A]
T
1 λ
∗
ξ∗2 + [A]
T
2 λ
∗
...
ξ∗N + [A]
T
Nλ
∗
Ax∗
 ,
ξ∗i ∈ ∂fi(x∗i ),∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}.
(30)
In (30), [A]i denotes the columns of matrix A that are asso-
ciated with agent i. By recalling the first-order necessary and
sufficient condition for convex programming [62], it is easy
to see that solving problem (6) amounts to solving the above
MV I(Q,U) [62]. Denote the solution set of MV I(Q,U) as
U∗. Since fi is convex, ∂fi(xi) is monotone, the MV I(Q,U)
is solvable and U∗ is nonempty [62].
Next, we introduce several lemmas and theorems that con-
tribute to the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. Each u∗ = (x∗,λ∗) in U∗ is also the saddle point
of the Lagrangian function L(x,λ) = f(x) + λTAx.
Proof: The results can be obtained from Part 2.1 in [10]
directly. 
Lemma 2. If Axk+1 = 0 and xk+1 = xk hold, then
(xk+11 ,x
k+1
2 , ...,x
k+1
N ,λ
k+1) is a solution to MV I(Q,U).
Proof: Using the definition of matrix A and the update rule
of λk+1 in (11), we can see that the assumption Axk+1 = 0
implies λk+1 = λk and xk+11 = x
k+1
2 = ... = x
k+1
N .
On the other hand, we know that xk+1i is the optimizer of
(13). By using the first-order optimality condition, we get
(xi − xk+1i )T (ξk+1i +
∑
j∈Ni
(λki,j
+ρki,j(x
k+1
i − xkj )) + γi(xk+1i − xki )) ≥ 0. (31)
where ξk+1i ∈ ∂fi(xk+1i ). Then based on the assumption
xk+1 = xk, the fact λk+1 = λk, and the definition of matrix
A, we have (xi−xk+1i )T (ξk+1i + [A]Ti λk+1) ≥ 0. Therefore,
(xk+11 ,x
k+1
2 , ...,x
k+1
N ,λ
k+1) is a solution to MV I(Q,U). 
Lemma 2 provides a sufficient condition for solving
MV I(Q,U). According to Lemma 1, we know that the solu-
tion to MV I(Q,U) is also the saddle point of the Lagrangian
function. Next, we prove that the iterates in Algorithm I satisfy
lim
k→∞
Axk+1 = 0 and lim
k→∞
xk+1 − xk = 0, i.e., Algorithm
I converges to the solution to MV I(Q,U). To achieve this
goal, we first establish the relationship (32) about iterates k
and k + 1 in Theorem 6, whose proof is mainly based on
convex properties. Then based on the relationship, we further
prove lim
k→∞
Axk+1 = 0 and lim
k→∞
xk+1−xk = 0 in Theorem
7.
Theorem 6. Let ρk satisfy Condition A, Q¯ , QP + QkC
satisfy Condition B, and (x∗,λ∗) be the saddle point of the
Lagrangian function L(x,λ) = f(x) + λTAx, then we have
‖ λk+1 − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1 + ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2Q¯
≤‖ λk − λ∗ ‖2(ρk)−1 + ‖ xk − x∗ ‖2Q¯
− (‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk + ‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2−ATρkA+Q¯)
+ ‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk+1 − ‖ Axk ‖2ρk .
(32)
To prove Theorem 6, we first introduce two lemmas:
Lemma 3. Let xk = [xkT1 ,xkT2 , ...,xkTN ]T and λk =
[λki,j ]ij,ei,j∈E be the intermediate results of iteration k in
Algorithm I, then the following inequality holds for all k:
f(x)− f(xk+1) + (x− xk+1)TATλk + (x− xk+1)T
·ATρkAxk + (x− xk+1)T Q¯(xk+1 − xk) ≥ 0, (33)
where Q¯ , QP +QkC .
Proof: The proof follows from [7]. For completeness, we
sketch the proof here. Denote by gi the function
gki (xi) =
∑
j∈Ni
(λkTi,j xi +
ρki,j
2
‖ xi − xkj ‖2) +
γi
2
‖ xi − xki ‖2 .
(34)
Using ξk+1i ∈ ∂fi(xk+1i ), we can get ξk+1i +Ogi(xk+1i ) =
0 and (xi−xk+1i )T [ξk+1i +Ogi(xk+1i )] = 0 based on the fact
that xk+1i is the optimizer of g
k
i + fi. On the other hand, as
fi is convex, the following relationship holds:
fi(xi) ≥ fi(xk+1i ) + (xi − xk+1i )T ξk+1i .
Then we can get fi(xi) − fi(xk+1i ) + (xi −
xk+1i )
TOgi(xk+1i ) ≥ 0.
Substituting Ogi(xk+1i ) with (34), we obtain
fi(xi)− fi(xk+1i ) + (xi − xk+1i )T ·
(
∑
j∈Ni
(λki,j + ρ
k
i,j(x
k+1
i − xkj )) + γi(xk+1i − xki )) ≥ 0.
Noting λi,i = 0 and λi,j = −λj,i, based on the definition
of matrices A and ρ, we can rewrite the above inequality as
fi(xi)− fi(xk+1i ) + (xi − xk+1i )T ·
([A]Ti λ
k +
∑
j∈Ni
ρki,j(x
k+1
i − xkj ) + γi(xk+1i − xki )) ≥ 0.
(35)
Summing both sides of (35) over i = 1, 2, . . . , N , and using
N∑
i=1
(xi − xk+1i )T [A]Ti λk = (x− xk+1)TATλk,
N∑
i=1
(xi − xk+1i )T
∑
j∈Ni
ρki,jx
k+1
i = (x− xk+1)TQkCxk+1,
N∑
i=1
(xi − xk+1i )T
∑
j∈Ni
ρki,jx
k
j
= (x− xk+1)T (−ATρkA+QkC)xk,
N∑
i=1
(xi − xk+1i )T γi(xk+1i − xki )
= (x− xk+1)TQP (xk+1 − xk),
we can get the lemma. 
Lemma 4. Let xk = [xkT1 ,xkT2 , ...,xkTN ]T and λk =
[λki,j ]ij,ei,j∈E be the intermediate results of iteration k in
Algorithm I, then the following equality holds for all k:
− (xk+1)TAT (λk − λ∗)
− (xk+1)TATρkAxk + (x∗ − xk+1)T Q¯(xk+1 − xk)
= −1
2
(‖ λk+1 − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1 − ‖ λk − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1)
+
1
2
‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2(ρk+1)−1 +
1
2
‖ A(xk+1 − xk) ‖2ρk
− 1
2
‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk −
1
2
‖ Axk ‖2ρk −
1
2
‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2Q¯
− 1
2
(‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2Q¯ − ‖ xk − x∗ ‖2Q¯).
(36)
Proof: For a scalar a, we have aT = a. Recall λk+1 =
λk + ρk+1Axk+1 and notice that ρk+1 is a positive definite
diagonal matrix, we can get
(xk+1)TAT (λk − λ∗) = (λk+1 − λk)T (ρk+1)−1(λk − λ∗).
(37)
On the other hand, since (x∗,λ∗) is the saddle point of
the Lagrangian function (15), we can get Ax∗ = 0 [48].
Moreover, the following equalities can be established by using
algebraic manipulations:
(xk+1 − x∗)T Q¯(xk+1 − xk) = 1
2
‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2Q¯
+
1
2
(‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2Q¯ − ‖ xk − x∗ ‖2Q¯),
(38)
−x(k+1)TATρkAxk = 1
2
‖ A(xk+1 − xk) ‖2ρk
− 1
2
‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk −
1
2
‖ Axk ‖2ρk ,
(39)
(λk+1 − λk)T (ρk+1)−1(λk − λ∗)
=
1
2
(‖ λk+1 − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1 − ‖ λk − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1),
− 1
2
‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2(ρk+1)−1 .
(40)
Then we can obtain (36) by plugging equalities (37)-(40) into
the left hand side of (36). 
Now we can proceed to prove Theorem 6. By setting x =
x∗ in (33), we can get
f(x∗)− f(xk+1) + (x∗ − xk+1)TATλk + (x∗ − xk+1)T
·ATρkAxk + (x∗ − xk+1)T Q¯(xk+1 − xk) ≥ 0.
Recalling Ax∗ = 0, the above inequality can be rewritten as
f(x∗)− f(xk+1)− x(k+1)TATλk
− x(k+1)TATρkAxk + (x∗ − xk+1)T Q¯(xk+1 − xk) ≥ 0.
(41)
Now adding and subtracting the term λ∗TAxk+1 from the
left hand side of (41) gives
f(x∗)− f(xk+1)− λ∗TAxk+1 − x(k+1)TAT (λk − λ∗)
− x(k+1)TATρkAxk + (x∗ − xk+1)T Q¯(xk+1 − xk) ≥ 0.
(42)
Using L(x,λ∗)− L(x∗,λ∗) ≥ 0 and Ax∗ = 0, we have
−x(k+1)TAT (λk − λ∗)
− x(k+1)TATρkAxk + (x∗ − xk+1)T Q¯(xk+1 − xk)
≥ f(xk+1) + λ∗TAxk+1 − f(x∗) ≥ 0.
Now by plugging (36) into the left hand side of the above
inequality, we can obtain
−1
2
(‖ λk+1 − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1 − ‖ λk − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1)
+
1
2
‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2(ρk+1)−1 +
1
2
‖ Axk+1 −Axk ‖2ρk
−1
2
‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk −
1
2
‖ Axk ‖2ρk −
1
2
‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2Q¯
+
1
2
‖ xk − x∗ ‖2Q¯ −
1
2
‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2Q¯≥ 0.
Noting ‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2(ρk+1)−1=‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk+1 , the above
inequality can be rewritten as
‖ λk+1 − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1 + ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2Q¯
≤‖ λk − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1 + ‖ xk − x∗ ‖2Q¯
− (‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk + ‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2−ATρkA+Q¯)
+ ‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk+1 − ‖ Axk ‖2ρk .
(43)
Recall that from Condition A, ρk+1  ρk and ρk
(k = 1, 2, ...) are positive definite diagonal matrices. So we
have (ρk+1)−1  (ρk)−1 [45], and consequently ‖ λk −
λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1‖ λk − λ∗ ‖2(ρk)−1 , which proves Theorem 6.

Theorem 6 established the relationship between iterates k
and k + 1 in Algorithm I. Based on this relationship, we can
have the following theorem which shows that Algorithm I
converges to the solution to MV I(Q,U).
Theorem 7. Let uk = (xk,λk) be the sequence generated by
Algorithm I, then we have
lim
k→∞
(‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk + ‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2−ATρkA+Q¯) = 0. (44)
Proof: Let αk =‖ λk − λ∗ ‖2(ρk)−1 + ‖ xk − x∗ ‖2Q¯.
According to Theorem 6, we have
αk+1 ≤ αk+ ‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk+1 − ‖ Axk ‖2ρk
− (‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk + ‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2−ATρkA+Q¯)
≤ ...
≤ α0+ ‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk+1 − ‖ Ax0 ‖2ρ0
−
k∑
i=0
(‖ Axi+1 ‖2ρi + ‖ xi+1 − xi ‖2−ATρiA+Q¯)
≤ α0+ ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2ATρk+1A
−
k∑
i=0
(‖ Axi+1 ‖2ρi + ‖ xi+1 − xi ‖2−ATρiA+Q¯).
(45)
The last inequality comes from the fact that Ax∗ = 0 and ‖
Axk+1−Ax∗ ‖2ρk+1 can be written as ‖ xk+1−x∗ ‖2ATρk+1A.
Recall that ρ0  ρk  ρk+1  ρ¯ holds and Q¯ − AT ρ¯A is
positive definite. Moving the term ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2ATρk+1A to
the left hand side of the above inequality, we have
lim
k→∞
(αk+1− ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2ATρk+1A)
= lim
k→∞
(‖ λk+1 − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1 + ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2Q¯−ATρk+1A)
≥ 0
(46)
Since α0 is positive and bounded and ‖ Axi+1 ‖2ρi + ‖ xi+1−
xi ‖2−ATρiA+Q¯ is nonnegative, following Theorem 3 in [46],
we have
lim
k→∞
(‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk + ‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2−ATρkA+Q¯) = 0. (47)

Given that ρk satisfies Condition A and Q¯ satisfies Condi-
tion B, we have that both −ATρkA+ Q¯ and ρk are positive
symmetric definite. Then according to Theorem 7, we have
Axk+1 = 0 and xk+1 = xk when k →∞.
Therefore, based on Lemma 2, we have that (xk+1,λk+1)
in Algorithm I converges to a solution to MV I(Q,U), i.e.,
a saddle point of the Lagrangian function (15) according to
Lemma 1. Since the objective function is convex, we can
conclude Theorem 1 [48]. 
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Now we prove that the convergence rate of Algorithm I is
O(1/t). By plugging (36) into the left hand side of (42), we
can obtain
f(x∗)− f(xk+1)− λ∗TAxk+1 (48)
−1
2
(‖ λk+1 − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1 − ‖ λk − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1)
+
1
2
‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2(ρk+1)−1 +
1
2
‖ Axk+1 −Axk ‖2ρk
−1
2
‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk −
1
2
‖ Axk ‖2ρk −
1
2
‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2Q¯
+
1
2
‖ xk − x∗ ‖2Q¯ −
1
2
‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2Q¯≥ 0.
Summing both sides of the above inequality over k =
0, 1, ..., t, we have
(t+ 1)f(x∗)−
t∑
k=0
f(xk+1)− λ∗TA
t∑
k=0
xk+1
−1
2
‖ λt+1 − λ∗ ‖2(ρt+1)−1 +
1
2
‖ λ0 − λ∗ ‖2(ρ1)−1
−
t∑
k=1
1
2
(‖ λk − λ∗ ‖2(ρk)−1 − ‖ λk − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1)
+
1
2
‖ Axt+1 ‖2ρt+1 −
t∑
k=0
1
2
‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk −
1
2
‖ Ax0 ‖2ρ0
−1
2
‖ xt+1 − x∗ ‖2Q¯ +
1
2
‖ x0 − x∗ ‖2Q¯
−
t∑
k=0
1
2
‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2Q¯−ATρkA≥ 0.
Following the above inequality, It is easy to obtain
(t+ 1)f(x∗)−
t∑
k=0
f(xk+1)− λ∗TA
t∑
k=0
xk+1
+
1
2
‖ λ0 − λ∗ ‖2(ρ1)−1 +
1
2
‖ x0 − x∗ ‖2Q¯
+
1
2
‖ Axt+1 ‖2ρt+1 −
1
2
‖ Axt+1 ‖2ρt≥ 0.
Recall that in (47), we have proven lim
k→∞
‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk= 0.
Then the relationship ρ0  ρk  ρk+1  ρ¯ implies
lim
t→∞(
1
2
‖ Axt+1 ‖2ρt+1 −
1
2
‖ Axt+1 ‖2ρt) = 0.
Therefore, there exists some constant c such that
1
2
‖ Axt+1 ‖2ρt+1 −
1
2
‖ Axt+1 ‖2ρt≤ c.
On the other hand, as our function is convex, we
have
∑t
k=0 f(x
k+1) ≥ (t + 1)f(x¯t+1) where x¯t+1 =
1
t+1
∑t
k=0 x
k+1. Therefore, we have
(t+ 1)f(x∗)− (t+ 1)f(x¯t+1)− (t+ 1)λ∗TAx¯t+1
+
1
2
‖ λ0 − λ∗ ‖2(ρ1)−1 +
1
2
‖ x0 − x∗ ‖2Q¯ +c ≥ 0.
By dividing both sides by −(t+ 1), we can obtain
f(x¯t+1) + λ∗TAx¯t+1 − f(x∗)
≤ 1
t+ 1
(
1
2
‖ λ0 − λ∗ ‖2(ρ1)−1 +
1
2
‖ x0 − x∗ ‖2Q¯ +c).
Combining the above relationship with the Lagrangian
function (15), we can conclude Theorem 2.
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